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Abstract
Hippocratic Databases have been proposed as a mechanism to guarantee the respect of
privacy principles in data management. We argue that three major principles are missing from
the proposed mechanism: hierarchies of purposes, delegation of tasks and authorizations (i.e.
outsourcing), and the minimal disclosure of private information.
In this paper, we propose a flexible framework for the negotiation of personal information
among customers and (possibly virtual) enterprises based on user preferences when enterprises
may adopt different processes to provide the same service. We use a goal-oriented approach to
analyze the purposes of a Hippocratic system and derive a purpose and delegation hierarchy.
Based on this hierarchy, effective algorithms are given to determine the minimum set of autho-
rizations needed for a service. In this way, the minimal authorization table of a global business
process can be automatically constructed from the collection of privacy policy tables associated
with the collaborating enterprises. By using effective on-line algorithms, the derivation of such
minimal information can also be done on-the-fly by the customer wishing to use the services of
a virtual organization.
1 Introduction
Since the early works on privacy protection in statistical databases [1], privacy research has gained
momentum. Changes in the landscape of legislation around the world, and growing consumer atten-
tion to the issue have changed attitudes towards security and privacy concerns for database systems.
This matches with a substantial body of research on approaches for managing the negotiation of
personal information among customers and enterprises [2, 3, 17, 19].
At the basis of every solution for the exchange between enterprises and customers, there is the
principle of transparency. Transparency means that when enterprises store data about customers
they should disclose to customers which data is collected and how it is used, i.e., for what pur-
pose data is maintained. Starting from the landmark proposals for Hippocratic databases [3], most
privacy-aware technologies use purpose as a central concept around which privacy protection is
built. For the transparency requirement, enterprises should declare in their privacy policies the pur-
pose for which data is collected, who can receive it, the length of time the data can be retained
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and the authorized users who can access it. Looking at such policies customers would be able to
understand how their personal data will be used and, in case they agree, disclose them.
Transparency is not the only principle, and another important notion which goes hand in hand
with transparency is the notion of minimal disclosure, as defined in the US Privacy Act of 1974
and the EU Directives on Privacy in 1995. This principle requires enterprises to maintain only
the information necessary to fulfill the purpose for which it has been collected. The principle of
minimal disclosure seems to be easily satisfiable. A company must simply ask the necessary data
and leave other useful but unnecessary fields as optional. We all experience this business practice
when filling in a web form.
However, enterprises are able to provide their services in different ways, and each different
method could require different data. For example, banks may deliver bank statements by email
and by regular post. Depending on the method, customers should provide their shipping address or
email to the bank. Asking for both addresses as compulsory would clearly violate the principle of
minimal disclosure.
If we consider these decisions, the burden of choice is on the human who must decide what
to do on the basis of his/her personal feeling of trust of the enterprises. But this is very difficult
for complex tasks, where there are many ways to deliver the service. The situation is worse if we
consider dynamic coalitions, such as those that might be soon available with Web Services and
Business Processes for Web Services. On the server side, we might not have a single enterprise, but
rather a host of partners participating in a business process. Further, companies may outsource a
large part of data processing to external supplier which on their own may do a similar process.
In some cases, the client process may even no longer be a human deciding to fill an email
field with her business email or a freshly created Yahoo address but rather a software client. A
software process needs automatic procedures for making such a judgment on the basis of some
general criteria provided by the user.
Classical privacy-aware systems such as Hippocratic Databases do not consider these issues of
delegation, minimality and their automatic treatment. In this paper we show how to address them.
1.1 The Contribution of this paper
This paper presents a flexible framework for automatically deriving the minimum set of authoriza-
tions needed to achieve a service (i.e., the minimal privacy authorization table) from the enterprise
privacy policy (privacy policy table) by determining the minimum set of data needed to fulfill re-
quired services based on users preferences and the partners entitled to access the data.
Following goal-oriented security requirements engineering approaches [9], we propose to an-
alyze the purposes behind the design of a Hippocratic system, and organize them in hierarchal
manner through AND- and OR-decompositions and delegation. Further, we extend that hierarchy
by associating to purposes the data needed to accomplish them. Once customers have given a weight
to each piece of data, one can determine the minimum set of data for fulfilling the root purpose with
respect to user preferences. Reasoning procedures for the fulfillment of users’ requirements by dif-
ferent solutions have been already investigated in goal oriented requirements engineering [10, 18].
However, their solution is not adequate for our purposes, as it is tailored to off-line analysis by the
system designer and not to on-the-fly selection by the system user.
In order to have more efficient algorithms, we represent purpose and delegation hierarchies
with hypergraphs [4, 5]. Based on this data structure, we provide algorithms for finding a minimal
decomposition path that represents the process that uses the minimum set of information to fulfill a
purpose, and for efficiently updating it when users change the cost of data items or choose among
the alternatives that an enterprise offers for achieving the required service. Then, this path is used
to determine the minimum set of authorizations needed to achieve a service.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Next (§2) we introduce a scenario used
as running example throughout the paper. We then provide (§3) a brief description of Hippocratic
databases. Then, we introduce purpose DAGs in order to represent purpose hierarchies (§4) and
discuss how to build a purpose DAG from a Hippocratic database system (§5). Next (§6) we present
algorithms for finding and updating the minimum cost path. Finally, we discuss related works and
conclude the paper with some directions for future work (§7).
2 A Running Example
Our scenario is a revised version of the case study proposed by Agrawal et al. [3].
Mississippi is an on-line bookseller who needs to obtain certain personal information to perform
purchase transactions. This information includes name, shipping address, and credit card number.
Mississippi views purchase (the root-level ”purpose” for its service) as a three-step process: credit
assessment, delivery, and notification. Delivery can be done by direct delivery or by post, while
notification can be done by email or by fax. Depending on the method of notification, Mississippi
needs either email or fax information.
Mississippi relies on Worldwide Express (WWEx) for shipping books. WWEx is a delivery
company that offers a global network of specialized services – transportation, international trade
support and supply chain services. WWEx also needs personal information to delivery books for
Mississippi. This information includes customer name and shipping address. In turn, WWEx de-
pends on local delivery companies for door-to-door delivery. To this end, WWEx delegates cus-
tomer information to them. In the remainder of the paper, we call LDC1, . . . ,LDCn the local deliv-
ery companies responsible to deliver books in the zone where the customer lives.
Furthermore, Mississippi relies on the Credit Card Company (CCC) for credit assessment. CCC
needs to obtain some information for providing credit assessment. This information includes cus-
tomer’s name and credit card number, and the transaction between Mississippi and the customer.
For making credit decisions, CCC wants a credit rating1. For this, CCC depends on the Credit Rat-
ing Company (CRC). CRC uses statistics to summarize past experience so that predictive analysis
can be used to generate a rating for the customer. Based on the rating, CCC can decide to accept or
not the customer transaction.
3 A Primer on Hippocratic Databases
Hippocratic databases [2, 3] use purpose as a central concept and consider it as a “special” attribute
occurring in every tables forming the database and associated with each piece of data stored in the
database.
Example 1 Table 1 shows the schema of two tables, customer and order, that store the personal
information collected by Mississippi.
1Credit rating is a method for interpreting the content of a credit report.
table attribute
customer purpose, customer-id, name, address, email, fax-number, credit-card-info
order purpose, customer-id, transaction, book-info, status
Table 1: Database Schema
table attributes
privacy-policies purpose, table, attribute, { external-recipients }, retention
privacy-authorizations purpose, table, attribute, { authorized-users }
Table 2: Privacy Metadata Schema
Then, for each purpose and for each data item stored in the database, we have:
• external-recipients: the actors to whom the data item is disclosed;
• retention-period: the period during which the data item should be maintained;
• authorized-users: the users entitled to access the data item.
Purpose, external recipients, authorized users, and retention period are stored in the database
with respect to the metadata schema defined in Table 2 [3]. Specifically, the above information
is split into separate tables: external-recipients and retention period are in Privacy-Policies Table
(PPT), while authorized-users in Privacy-Authorizations Table (PAT). The purpose is stored in both
of them. PPT contains the privacy policies of the enterprise, while PAT contains the access controls
policies that implement the privacy policy and represents the actual disclosure of information. In
particular, PAT is created from PPT by instantiating each external recipient with the corresponding
users. Therefore, Hippocratic systems define a PAT for each PPT. These tables are equal for every
customer, and so they do not appreciate individual user preferences.
Example 2 According the PPT of Mississippi, it can access both email and fax number for notify-
ing the status of the order. WWEx, Post Ofce, and all LDCs can access customer data for direct
delivery, delivery by post and door-to-door delivery, respectively. These authorizations match ex-
actly the policies declared in the corresponding PPTs.
Mississippi’s privacy policy table is shown in Table 6 (Appendix A) and CCC’s privacy policy
table in Table 7 (Appendix A). The corresponding privacy authorization table are in Table 8 and 9
(Appendix A).
Before users disclose their information, the Privacy Constraint Validator is used to verify
whether user preferences match the privacy policy of the enterprise. In this way, Hippocratic DBs
implement the consent principle. When queries are submitted to the database, the system answers
only queries for which the purpose is equal to that for which data has been stored. Further, Hippo-
cratic DBs do not disclose information for purposes different from those for which the owner of the
information have previously give the consent. Thus, Hippocratic DBs implement, respectively, the
limited use and disclosure principles. To enforce the retention principle, Hippocratic DBs use the
Data Retention Manager which deletes data items when their retention period is expired.
The limited collection principle requires that enterprises collect the minimum set of data needed
to fulfill the purpose for which data is stored. Hippocratic DBs use three components to implement
such principle: Access Analysis, that identifies for each purpose which data never occurs in query
answers; Granularity Analysis, that determines the granularity of the required information; Minimal
Query Generation, that designs queries that disclose the minimum set of data needed for fulfilling
a certain purpose.
4 Hierarchy and Delegation of Purposes
Hippocratic systems are an elegant and simple solution but do not allow for dynamic situations
that could arise with web services and business process software. In such settings, enterprises may
provide services in many different ways and may delegate the execution of parts of the service
to third parties. This is indeed the case of a virtual organization based on business process for
web service where different partners explicitly integrate their efforts into one process. This affects
mainly the creation of the PAT.
Agrawal et al. [3] propose to split a purpose into multiple purposes and then store them in the
database. In this way, we lose the relation among a purpose and its sub-purposes. Karjoth et al.
[11] use a directory-like notation to represent purpose hierarchies. However, this notation does not
distinguish if a sub-purpose is derived by AND or OR decomposition, and consequently cannot be
used to reason about the fulfillment of the root purpose. Additionally the same sub-purpose may
be part of different purposes. This distinction is important from the perspective of minimality of
information. For example, providing both an email address and a physical address might be needed
to provide the password for access to the tracking service and the actual shipping of goods and
those purposes may be both necessary (AND) to obtain a certain higher level goal. However, in
other cases only one of them could be necessary (OR). Therefore, requiring both of them would be
a violation of the minimality principle.
Our approach is based on traditional goal analysis [14], and consists of decomposing purposes
into sub-purposes through an AND/OR refinement. If purpose p is AND-decomposed (respectively,
OR-decomposed) into sub-purposes p1, . . . , pn, then all (at least one) of the sub-purposes must be
satisfied for satisfying p. The idea is to represent purpose hierarchies with hypergraphs [4, 5], and
we will call them purpose directed acyclic graphs (or purpose DAGs, for short).
Definition 1 A purpose DAG P is a pair 〈P,D〉 where P is a set of purposes and D is a set of
decomposition arcs. Each decomposition arc is an ordered pair 〈S, t〉 from an arbitrary nonempty
set S ⊆ P (source set) to a single node t ∈ P (target node).
Definition 2 Let P = 〈P,D〉 be a purpose DAG. A purpose DAG P ′ = 〈P ′, D′〉 such that P ′ ⊆ P
and D′ ⊆ D and, for each 〈S, t〉 ∈ D′, S ⊆ P ′, is called sub purpose DAG of P . This is denoted
by P ′ ⊆ P .
The enterprise-wide privacy policies is derived by looking at the Hippocratic database of each
partner involved in the business process and merging them into a single purpose DAG. Therefore,
purpose DAGs can be recognized as the outcome of a process of refinements of goals and delegation
of tasks in security requirements modeling methodologies [9]. Fig. 1 shows an example of purpose
DAG. Each node is composed by two parts: a purpose identifier and the list of data items needed
to fulfill the purpose. Broken lines partition the purpose DAG in sub purpose DAG, and each of
them represents the policies of a single enterprise, and so purposes on the broken line can be seen
as services whose execution is delegated to other suppliers.
Definition 3 Let P = 〈P,D〉 be a purpose DAG, X ⊆ P be a non-empty subset of purposes, and
y be a purpose in P . A decomposition path DX;y is a set of decomposition arcs D′ ⊆ D such that
either y ∈ X or there exists a decomposition arcs 〈Z, y〉 ∈ D ′ and there are decomposition paths
DX;z ∈ D
′ for each z ∈ Z .
Essentially, a decomposition path represents a possible process through which an enterprise
can fulfill a root purpose. Our goal is to decide which is the process with the “minimum privacy
penalty” to fulfill the root purpose with respect to the user’s preferences. This can be performed
through a quantitative analysis. In order to support quantitative analysis, we need to introduce the
notion of weighted purpose DAG.
Definition 4 A weighted purpose DAG P = 〈P,D〉 is one where each decomposition arc 〈X, y〉 ∈
D has associated with it a weight ω〈X;y〉.
Since decomposition paths have a complex structure, different ways can be used to measure
the cost of the same decomposition path. Depending on the weight measure, the problem can be
polynomially tractable [8] or NP-hard [6, 7, 16]. The problem of finding a minimal cost hyperpath in
a directed hypergraph is shown to be NP-hard when the cost of a hyperpath is the sum of the weights
of its hyperarcs [4, 5]. By making the cost function additive, Martelli and Montanari [13] were able
to formulate a polynomial time algorithm for AND/OR graphs. For additive cost functions, the cost
of one edge is counted as many times as it is traversed. Additive cost functions are also considered
in hypergraph approaches that find optimal hyperpaths in polynomial time [4, 5].
For our purposes, we use an additive cost function. We believe that additive measures are the
ones that capture best the intuitive way in which we might wish to protect our privacy. In a nutshell,
if the same datum is disclosed N times, then the cost of these disclosures is N, rather than 1. After
all, the more a datum is used, the more it is likely that it might be compromised, or the more it is
likely to end up in companies not so privacy-aware. The more our data are tossed back and forth
the less happy we are.
Definition 5 Let X be a source set, y be a purpose node, and DX;y be a decomposition path from X
to y. The disclosure penalty (or privacy penalty) to reach y starting from X , dp(X, y), is inductively
dened as follows:
1. if y ∈ X , then dp(X, y) = 0
2. if path DX;y has root 〈Z, y〉 with subpath DX;z1 , . . . ,DX;zk , then dp(X, y) = ω〈Z;y〉 +∑
zi∈Z dp(X, zi)
5 From Hippocratic DBs to Purpose DAG
We now have the machinery to construct a purpose DAG when orchestrating a business process
composed by many different partners (each with its own Hippocratic DB). The construction is
sketched below.
• For each supplier PPT, purposes are analyzed through a goal refinement process, and so they
are structured with respect to AND/OR decomposition. These purpose DAGs are circum-
scribed by a broken line and labeled with the supplier’s name.
• Once we have a DAG for each supplier, we build the DAG representing the privacy policy of
the entire business process by merging them.
• Then each purpose is associated with the data items directly needed to achieve the purpose
itself (data items needed to achieves its sub-purposes are linked directly to sub-purposes).
Merging is done by looking at the external-recipients field in every PPT: when the external-
recipients field is not empty, we connect that purpose with the corresponding purpose (with the
same name) occurring in the DAG associated with the supplier that is an instance of some external
recipient. If there is more than one instance for the same external recipient, we create a fictitious
node and OR decompose it into a number of nodes equal to the number of possible instances. This
is also what happens if we have multiple external suppliers for the same purpose. This approach
supports complex enterprise strategies and, at the same time, allows customers to directly choose
a certain supplier whenever the choice is possible. To support this process, we assume a common
ontology among all the actors involved in the purpose DAG.2
The last step takes into account the data items we need to satisfy a purpose and the privacy
penalty assigned to each data item by users. The idea is to create a node for each data item and link
it to the purposes that directly requires it. So, we add to the purpose DAG n + 1 nodes where n is
the number of data items. Then, if a purpose node has no incoming decomposition arcs, we link to
the purpose the data items needed to fulfill it with decomposition arc 〈X, t〉 where X is the set of
data items and t the purpose node. Otherwise, if node t has already an incoming decomposition arc
〈X ′, t〉, this is replaced by the decomposition arc 〈X ∪X ′, t〉. We link to each data item nodes the
last node, source node, with arc 〈⊥, t〉, where ⊥ is the source node and t is a data item node.
Example 3 Fig. 1 shows the purpose DAG extended within data items corresponding to the running
example. Each purpose DAG on a broken line represents the hierarchical model of the privacy
policies concerning a partner. In particular, Mississippi AND-decomposes purchase into delivery,
credit assessment whose execution is delegated to CCC, and notification. Thus, all sub purposes
have to be reached in order to reach the root purpose. Then, the store OR-decomposes delivery into
direct delivery for which it depends on WWEx, and delivery by post for which it depends on Post
Ofce. These purposes are the root of the DAGs associated with WWEx and Post Ofce. Finally, the
store achieves notification either by fax or by email. These purposes are not further on decomposed,
and so are linked to the data items needed to fulll them.
Every decomposition arc has disclosure penalty equal to 0, except the decomposition arcs join-
ing source node and data item nodes, and delegation arcs. In the first case, the disclosure penalty
corresponds to the cost of perceived disclosure of data. The latter represents the disclosure penalty
to delegate information. Both these assignments are given by data owners with respect to their own
preferences. In particular, weight on delegation edges from one supplier to the sub-suppliers can be
defined by asking the users to specify the level of trust they feel about sub-suppliers.
2This assumption is also necessary in Hippocratic database systems. If external recipients of data could assign a
semantics to a purpose that is different from the semantics assigned by the Hippocratic database owner we could as well
eliminate the entire tagging process and provide all data with purpose “do-what-you-please”.
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Figure 1: Purpose DAG
6 Minimum Cost Algorithms
Customers do not want to disclose more data than needed to get the desired service. This corre-
sponds to finding the minimal decomposition path from the source node to the root purpose. This
path can be used to build the minimal PAT that represents the minimum set of authorizations for
fulfilling the root purpose. A key observation is that such computation cannot in general be done by
the company providing the service once and for all customers: customers may associate a different
privacy penalty to the provision of the same data item. Therefore, they are interested in finding the
minimum information cost for fulfilling the root purpose with respect to their own preferences. The
computation of minimal preferences is essentially a dynamic on-line process.
In order to design efficient algorithms for dynamic evaluation of privacy preferences, we use
FD-graph [5] whose definition is given below.
Definition 6 Given a purpose DAG P = 〈P,D〉, let S be the set of source set, i.e., S = {Z|
there exists a decomposition arc 〈Z, i〉 ∈ D and |Z| > 1}. The FD-graph of P is a labeled graph
G(P) = 〈Ps ∪ Pc, Aor ∪Aand〉, where:
1. Ps ≡ P is a set of simple nodes;
2. Pc is the set of compound nodes which is in bijective relationship with S . If Z ∈ S is a
source set then z will denote the corresponding compound node, and any simple node zi in
the source set Z will be called a component node of compound node z;
3. Aor ⊆ (Pc × Ps) ∪ (Ps × Ps) = {(z, x)|〈Z, x〉 ∈ D} is the set of edges referred to as
OR-edges, in bijective relationship with D;
Data Structure Type Description
LAST [y] node Pointer to the last node in the minimal path from source node to simple
node y.
DISCLOSE [y] integer Privacy penalty from the source node to node y.
NEEDED [y] data item list Data items needed to fulfill node y.
TODO[y] integer For simple nodes, it says if node y is reachable.
For compound nodes, it is the number of simple nodes (that compound
y) which are not reachable from the source.
Table 3: Data Structures
4. Aand ⊆ Ps×Pc = {(zi, z)|z ∈ Nc and zi ∈ Z} is the set of edges referred to as AND-edges,
connecting any compound node to its components
Essentially, a decomposition arc is represented by a compound node with a leaving OR-edge
and one or more incoming AND-edges. The OR-edge corresponds to the OR choice of selecting the
decomposition arc. Once the decomposition arc is selected, all purposes in its source set must be
fulfilled. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the decomposition arcs of a given purpose
DAG P and OR-edges of the corresponding FD-graph G(P). If a decomposition arc of P has
a weight, this is associated to the corresponding OR-edge. FD-graphs can be implemented by
maintaining adjacency lists where all OR (AND) edges leaving a node y are organized in Lor(y)
(Land(y)).
When we design a system we can distinguish two phases, namely Requirements Capture phase
and Privacy Assessment phase. Each of these phases involves some operations: the Requirements
Capture phase requires an initialization phase and support for deleting arcs, adding arcs, increasing
weights and decreasing weights, while the Privacy Assessment phase requires support for deleting
arcs and increasing weights.
Next, we present the data structures used in the algorithms. A summary of such data structures
is shown in Table 3. In order to retrieve the minimal decomposition path, the idea is to store for
each simple node y, the incoming decomposition arcs belonging to the minimal decomposition path
(backward pointers [5]) by using LAST [y]. This points to the last node in the minimal decompo-
sition path from source node ⊥ to simple node y, otherwise, if there is no path from ⊥ to y, it is
equal to nil .
The privacy penalty of the minimal decomposition paths from ⊥ to any other simple or com-
pound node y is stored in DISCLOSE [y]. For every node, the privacy penalty is initialized to in-
finity (∞). The list of data item needed to fulfill a purpose y is stored in the variable NEEDED[y].
At the beginning, for every node y, NEEDED[y] = ∅ except for the nodes associated to a data item
where the list contains the data item itself. The symbol ] is used to represent concatenation of lists.
Finally, the variable TODO [y] is used to store if there is a path from ⊥ to y. A node y is visited if
the value of TODO [y] is equal to 0. For any simple node x, TODO[x] is initialized to 1, and for
any compound node z (with components z1, . . . , zq), TODO [z] is initialized to
∑q
k=1 TODO [zk].
In the remainder of the section, we present some algorithms for finding and updating the min-
imum cost decomposition path. A summary of such algorithms is given in Table 4 where I and U
are respectively used for initialization and update.
Phase Name Input Description
I MinimumCost Find the minimal decomposition path for a purpose
DAG.
I ScanMC t: node
x: simple-node
Scan OR-edges and update priority queue. Called by
MinimumCost.
U Insert 〈X, y〉: decomposition arc
ω: weight
Update the minimal decomposition path when arcs are
inserted or weight is decreased.
U WeightIncrease 〈X, y〉: decomposition arc
ω: weight
Update the minimal decomposition path when arcs are
delated or weight is increased.
U ScanIWI t: node
x: simple-node
Scan OR-edges and update priority queue. Called by
Insert and WeightIncrease.
Table 4: Algorithms for initializing and updating the minimal decomposition path
6.1 Initialization
Initialization refers to find the minimum cost decomposition path for a new purpose DAG. The
following algorithms are based on [5] and are essentially a variant of Dijkstra classical minimum
spanning tree algorithm. The algorithms are described in the following, while the pseudocode is
given in Fig. 2 and 3.
Algorithm MinimumCost uses a priority3 queue PQ whose elements have the form (Ct, It, 〈s, t〉)
where 〈s, t〉 is an OR-edge, and Ct and It are, respectively, the privacy penalty and the list of data
items associated with the node t. The algorithm inserts as a first element in the priority queue the
item (0, ∅, 〈⊥,⊥〉). Then, repeatedly, the algorithm extracts from the queue PQ the node t with
minimum priority Ct which is assumed to be the privacy penalty of the minimal decomposition
path from ⊥ to t. Thereby, all OR-edges outgoing from t are scanned by procedure ScanMC, all
AND-edges 〈t, z〉 are analyzed. For each compound node z, TODO [z] is decreased, and if it is
equal to 0 the privacy penalty of the minimal decomposition path from ⊥ to z is computed. Then,
all OR-edges outgoing from z are scanned by procedure ScanMC. Procedure ScanMC aims at
analyzing OR-edges 〈t, x〉: if the ingoing node x is not already visited, the procedure inserts it in
the priority queue; otherwise, the penalty of x is updated if and only if edge 〈t, x〉 improves the old
penalty associated with x.
Example 4 Dening default preferences, Mississippi gives a value on data items and delegation
steps (Table 5). It prefers to deliver books by using a delivery company because this method is
more secure and faster. Further, it prefers to notify by fax. Fig. 4 shows the minimum cost path.
Comparing it with Fig. 1, we can see that email does not occur anymore since fax has a lower
penalty. Also the DAGs labeled with Post Ofce and LDC2 are no longer considered since the sum
of the penalties associated with WWEx and LDC1 is lower than those associated with Post Ofce
and LDC2.4
It is possible to prove, as done in [5] that
1. a node y is marked (i.e., TODO [y] = 0) if it is reachable from the source node;
3Lowest data required in, first out.
4The penalty for delegating data to LDC2 includes the trust level associated with WWEx.
Algorithm MinimumCost
Output:
DISCLOSE [y] : integer;
NEEDED [y] : data item list;
TODO[y] : integer;
LAST [y] : node;
begin
make-PQ -empty;
PQ-insert(0, ∅, 〈⊥,⊥〉);
TODO[⊥] := 0;
while PQ-nonempty do begin
PQ-extract(Ct, It, 〈s, t〉); {extract from the queue PQ the node t with minimum priority Ct}
DISCLOSE [t] := Ct;
NEEDED [t] := It;
LAST [t] := s;
for each {OR-edge} 〈t, x〉 ∈ Lor(t) do ScanMC(t, x);
for each {AND-edge} 〈t, z〉 ∈ Land(t) do begin
decrement(TODO [z]);
if TODO [z] = 0 {If node z is reached the privacy penalty of the path from ⊥ to z is computed}
then begin
DISCLOSE [z] :=
∑
zi∈z
DISCLOSE [zi]
NEEDED [z] :=
⊎
zi∈z
NEEDED[zi]
for each {OR-edge} 〈z, x〉 ∈ Lor(z) do ScanMC(z, x);
end
end
end
end
Figure 2: Algorithm MinimumCost
Procedure ScanMC(t: node; x: simple-node);
begin
Ct,x := ω〈t,x〉 + DISCLOSE [t];
It,x := NEEDED [t];
if TODO[t] = 1 {check if node t has been previously visited}
then begin
decrement(TODO [t]); {if not, node t is marked as reached
PQ-insert(Ct,x, It,x, 〈t, x〉); and arc 〈t, x〉 is inserted in PQ}
end
else if Ct,x < Cx {otherwise, PQ is update only if arc 〈t, x〉 improves minimal path}
then PQ-decrease(Ct,x, It,x, 〈t, x〉);
end
Figure 3: Procedure ScanMC
2. the algorithm computes correctly the minimal privacy penalty from ⊥ to any other node in
the purpose DAG;
3. the algorithm terminates in linear time in the size of the purpose DAG.
Data Item Cost Delegation Cost
name 1 CCC 2
address 5 CRC 4
email 4 WWEx 2
fax-number 2 LDC1 2
credit-card-info 10 LDC2 3
transaction 5 Post Office 5
book-info 2
status 3
Table 5: User Preferences
name
name
notification
credit
assessment
credit
resolution
credit
rating
transaction
transaction
fax−number
fax−number
status
status
booh−info
booh−info
CCC
credit−card−info
credit−card−info
address
address
delivery (1)
door−to−door
LDC1
delivery
delivery
direct
purchase
Mississippi
WWEx
notification
by fax
delivery
door−to−door
CRC
Figure 4: Minimum Decomposition Path
Every purpose can be seen as a business process. Business processes can be combined, and the
“new” process can be seen as an atomic process. Atomic processes follow the ACID properties [15]
that guarantee that all participants will see the same outcome: in case of success all services make
the results of their operation permanent by commitment, otherwise all services undo all operations
they have requested and data is not disclosed. Thus, to guarantee consistent and reliable execution,
we should check if the minimal path exists. This path is then used to build the PAT where external
recipients are instantiated by the corresponding authorized users. This ensures that a user discloses
all information needed to fulfill the service only if a path exists and that disclosed information is
the minimum cost set of data necessary to fulfill the service.
Example 5 Mississippi is authorized to notify the status of the order only by fax, and so it can
collect only data related to that purpose for notication. LDC1 can access only data needed for
door-to-door delivery, and so WWEx for direct delivery. In turn, Mississippi is entitled to access
those data for achieving delivery. Moreover, CRC is authorized to access only data need for credit
rating and CCC for credit resolution. Then, CCC can access only those data for performing credit
assessment. Finally, Mississippi is entitled to collect data for achieving purchase in accordance
with those allowed for its sub purposes. As shown in Fig. 4, Mississippi cannot access customer
email.
Table 10 (Appendix B) shows the PAT derived from minimum cost path in Fig. 4. A comparison
among the minimal PAT and the PATs derived by Hippocratic systems is in Appendix B.
6.2 On-the-fly Update of Customer Privacy Preferences
Both requirements capture and privacy assessment phases require to update the solution when
weights are modified. In particular, the privacy assessment phase requires that data structures are
maintained and that operations are performed on-line. The idea is to reuse the valid part of the old
solution as much as possible.
The problem of dynamically updating the purpose DAG can be essentially divided in two dis-
tinct classes depending on the update operations that are possible:
• adding new arcs or decreasing the privacy penalty of an existing arc;
• deleting an existing arc or increasing the privacy penalty of an existing arc.
One problem of on-line procedures is to represent the FD-graph corresponding to the purpose
dag. In the case of off-line procedures, we know a priori all simple and compound nodes, but in on-
line procedures we have to take into account that new compound nodes can be inserted. Thus, when
a decomposition arc is considered, we have to check whether the source set of the decomposition
arc to be introduced corresponds to an existing compound node in the FD-graph. To this end, we
use a function Compound that returns the compound node x corresponding to source set X , if such
compound node already exists, otherwise creates it and performs any necessary initialization.
The procedure Insert maintains the minimum decomposition path when new decomposition
arcs are inserted or the cost of an existing decomposition arc is decreased. The pseudocode is
shown in Fig. 5 and 7 and are based on ones presented in [5]. The idea is that changes are prop-
agated bottom-up, and propagation is blocked when a root of some subpath remains unchanged.
The procedure takes as input an existing hypergraph 〈X, t〉 and its updated value and determines
the compound node x corresponding to the source set X by using function Compound. If such
node already exists, its penalty is updated; otherwise, the new decomposition arc and its penalty are
insert in the dag. Notice that the first case corresponds to decrease the penalty of existing decom-
position arc, while the second to add a new decomposition arc. Then, the idea is to verify if the
decomposition arc yields a decomposition path that improves the old penalty. If it is the case, the
decomposition arc is considered; otherwise the algorithm terminates since minimum cost path does
not change. Then, repeatedly, the algorithm extracts from the queue PQ the node t with minimum
priority Ct which is assumed to be the privacy penalty of the minimal decomposition path from ⊥
to t. Thereby, all OR-edges outgoing from t are scanned by procedure ScanIWI, all AND-edges
are analyzed. If an AND-edges 〈t, z〉 yields a decomposition path that improves the old penalty, the
compound node z is updated and all OR-edges outgoing from it are scanned by procedure ScanIWI.
In the case the customer increases the privacy penalty of decomposition arcs, we use algorithm
WeightIncrease to build the new minimum cost decomposition path. The pseudocode is given
in Fig. 6 and 7. The idea is that if the decomposition arc does not belong to the minimum cost
decomposition path, this path does not change since we are analyzing only weight increase and arc
deletion. If the decomposition arc belongs to the minimal path, we examine the other decomposition
arcs having node t as head. To this end, we use the function backward Bor where, given a node
x, Bor(x) = {h ∈ D|x = head (h)}. Essentially, Bor(x) is the set of incoming decomposition
Procedure Insert(〈X, y〉: decomposition arc, ω: weight);
begin
if |X| = 1
then x := the single element of X;
else x := Compound(X);
if there exists a OR-edge 〈x, y; ω〈x,y〉〉 ∈ Lor(x)
then ω〈x,y〉 := ω; {weight decrease (assume ω < ω〈x,y〉)}
else insert 〈x, y;ω〉 into Lor(x); {arc insertion}
Cx,y := ω + DISCLOSE [x];
Ix,y := NEEDED [x];
if Cx,y < DISCLOSE [y]
then begin
make-PQ-empty;
PQ-insert(Cx,y, Ix,y, 〈x, y〉);
while PQ-nonempty do begin
PQ-extract(Ct, It, 〈s, t〉); {extract from the queue PQ the node t with minimum priority Ct}
DISCLOSE [t] := Ct;
NEEDED [t] := It;
LAST [t] := s;
for each {OR-edge} 〈t, x〉 ∈ Lor(t) do ScanIWI(t, x);
for each {AND-edge} 〈t, z〉 ∈ Land(t) do begin
c :=
∑
zi∈z
DISCLOSE [zi];
d :=
⊎
zi∈z
NEEDED[zi];
if c < DISCLOSE [z] then begin {arc 〈t, z〉 is considered only if it improves minimal path}
DISCLOSE [z] := c;
NEEDED[z] := d;
for each {OR-edge} 〈z, t〉 ∈ Lor(z) do ScanIWI(z, x);
end
end
end
end
end
Figure 5: Procedure Insert
arcs of x. Any time a decomposition arc that does not belong to the minimum cost path is found,
it is pruned. The procedure WeightIncrease can be simply re-used for the case of arc deletion by
defining the weight equal to infinity (∞).
Example 6 Alice, a Mississippi’s customer, does not agree with default user preferences given by
Mississippi. In particular, she prefers to receive books by post because she does not trust to give
her address to delivery companies after a bad experience with a local delivery company. To this
end, she denes the cost of delegation information to WWEx equal to innity (∞). Further, she
does not have a personal fax and must use her company’s fax where faxes are rst given to the
program manager’s secretary for distribution to the staff. Thus, she denes the cost of fax number
equal to 20. Fig. 8 shows the minimal path computed with respect to her user preferences. The
corresponding PAT (Table 11 in Appendix B) shows that Mississippi cannot access her fax number
for notication and that WWEx and local delivery companies cannot access any of her data; only
Post Ofce is entitled to access her data for delivering the purchased books.
Procedure WeightIncrease(〈X,y〉: decomposition arc, ω: weight);
begin
if |X| = 1
then x := the single element of X;
else x := Compound(X);
if LAST [y] = x then begin {arc 〈x, y〉 is considered only if it belongs to minimal path}
DISCLOSE [y] := ω + DISCLOSE [x];
for each {OR-edge} 〈s, y〉 ∈ Bor(y) do ScanIWI(s, y);
while PQ-nonempty do begin
PQ-extract(Ct, It, 〈s, t〉); {extract from the queue PQ the node t with minimum priority Ct}
DISCLOSE [t] := Ct;
NEEDED [t] := It;
LAST [t] := s;
for each {OR-edge} 〈t, x〉 ∈ Lor(t) do
if LAST [x] = t then {arc 〈t, x〉 is considered only if it belongs to minimal path}
for each {OR-edge} 〈s, x〉 ∈ Bor(x) do ScanIWI(s, x);
for each {AND-edge} 〈t, z〉 ∈ Land(t) do begin
c :=
∑
zi∈z
DISCLOSE [zi]
d :=
⊎
zi∈z
NEEDED [zi]
if c < DISCLOSE [z] then begin {arc 〈t, z〉 is considered only if it improves minimal path}
DISCLOSE [z] := c
NEEDED [z] := d
for each {OR-edge} 〈z, x〉 ∈ Lor(z) do
if LAST [x] = z then {arc 〈z, x〉 is considered only if it belongs to minimal path}
for each {OR-edge} 〈s, x〉 ∈ Bor(x) do ScanIWI(s, x);
end
end
end
end
Figure 6: Procedure WeightIncrease
Procedure ScanIWI(t: node; x : simple-node);
begin
Ct,x := ω〈t,x〉 + DISCLOSE [t];
It,x := NEEDED [t];
if Ct,x < DISCLOSE [x] {arc 〈t, x〉 is considered only if it improves minimal path}
then if 〈t, x〉 /∈ PQ
then PQ-insert(Ct,x, It,x, 〈t, x〉);
else PQ-decrease(Ct,x, It,x, 〈t, x〉);
end
Figure 7: Procedure ScanIWI
7 Related Work and Conclusion
Last years have seen an increasing attention to privacy-protection technologies and the negotiation
of private information between customers and companies. Tumer et al. [19] present a framework
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address
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Figure 8: Minimum Decomposition Path
for Web Services that allows users and enterprises to automatically negotiate personal information.
Each data item is defined as Mandatory or Optional by an enterprise, while users define for each
part of their personal information the kind of access, namely Free, Limited, or NotGiven. Then, the
framework matches enterprise policies with user preferences. If a mandatory input is not given by
a user, enterprises can find alternative strategies in order to reach an agreement with the user.
A policy itself may be sensitive since analyzing the disclosed policies an unauthorized user
may infer sensitive information. Therefore, some approaches aim not only to protect personal
information, but also policies themselves. LeFevre et al. [12] provide an approach for forcing
queries to respect privacy policies stated by an enterprise and users preferences. Their idea is to
specify additional conditions to regulate the disclosure of information. Another approach to avoid
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information is Automated Trust Negotiation [17]. It aims to
regulate iterative disclosures of credentials and requests between requesters and provider. These
approaches are different from ours since we assume that information are committed only after
checking that enterprise policies comply with user preferences. We argue that, if policies are not
known at priori, users cannot know which data they have to provide. It may be possible that users
discover that an enterprise requires more information than they (the users) consider reasonably
sufficient to provide the service only when they have already disclosed part of their information.
The main contribution of this paper is a framework for deriving the minimum set of authoriza-
tions needed to provide a service by determining the minimum set of information a customer has to
give. In particular, our approach provides support to Hippocratic systems for enforcing the limited
collection principle when a complex business process is analyzed and user preferences are consid-
ered. Indeed Hippocratic systems create a privacy authorization table shared by all customers. This
does not allow to distinguish which particular method is used for delivering a service, and so to
customize the minimum set of information. Therefore, access analysis is only able to determine
which data items are never used for a purpose and, consequently, minimal query generation works
on a set of information that is not minimum. Finally, our framework ensures that a user discloses
all (and only) the information required by the process that uses the minimum set of information to
delivery the service.
There are some issues left as future work. One of these is to introduce an actor hierarchy
to model the hierarchical nature of organizations (e.g., company-division-department-individual
worker). Further, customers must be assured that they are getting a complete and correct answer to
their queries before delegating privacy information. To this end, we are investigating the usage of
Merkle Trees to build a global certificate to be provided to the client by composing the individual
certificates from the various business partners.
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A Privacy-Policy Tables
Mississippi’s privacy policy table is shown in Table 6 and CCC’s privacy policy table in Table 7.
B Comparison among Privacy-Authorizations Tables
The privacy authorization tables derived by privacy policies tables presented in Appendix A by
using the Hippocratic database approach are in Table 8 and 9. Table 10 and 11 show the privacy
authorization tables derived from the minimal decomposition path in Fig. 4 and 8, respectively.
We can see that the Hippocratic database approach defines a privacy authorization table for each
privacy policy table. These authorization tables are equal for every customer, and so they do not
take into account individual user preferences. This entails that they do not implement the notion of
minimality of disclosure of information with respect to preferences of single users. For example,
Mississippi is authorized to access both email and fax number for notifying the status of the order
(Table 8) when just one of these data items is necessary and sufficient to achieve notification purpose
(Table 10 and 11).
Furthermore, Table 8 and 9 show how the Hippocratic database approach grants additional
unnecessary authorizations. Actually, this approach allows a supplier to access data for fulfill a
purpose that the supplier has already delegated to some sub-suppliers since it is not able to achieve
the purpose by itself. The notion of minimality of disclosure of information involves that only who
is able to delivery a service should be entitled to access the data. This is corresponds to need-to-
know principle for which data owners want to ensure that their data are not delegated to recipients
that do not need to have permission on it. For instance, Mississippi should not access credit card
information for credit assessment as show in Table 10 and 11.
purpose table attribute external-recipients retention
purchase customer name empty 1 month
purchase customer address empty 1 month
purchase customer email empty 1 month
purchase customer fax-number empty 1 month
purchase customer credit-card-info empty 1 month
purchase order transaction empty 1 month
purchase order book-info empty 1 month
purchase order status empty 1 month
delivery customer name empty 1 month
delivery customer address empty 1 month
direct delivery customer name { delivery-company } 1 month
direct delivery customer address { delivery-company } 1 month
delivery by post customer name { post-office } 1 month
delivery by post customer address { post-office } 1 month
credit-assessment customer name { credit-card-company } 1 month
credit-assessment customer credit-card-info { credit-card-company } 1 month
credit-assessment order transaction { credit-card-company } 1 month
notification customer name empty 1 month
notification customer email empty 1 month
notification customer fax-number empty 1 month
notification order book-info empty 1 month
notification order status empty 1 month
notification by email customer name empty 1 month
notification by email customer email empty 1 month
notification by email order book-info empty 1 month
notification by email order status empty 1 month
notification by fax customer name empty 1 month
notification by fax customer fax-number empty 1 month
notification by fax order book-info empty 1 month
notification by fax order status empty 1 month
Table 6: Mississippi’s Privacy-Policies Table
purpose table attribute external-recipients retention
credit-assessment customer name empty 1 month
credit-assessment customer credit-card-info empty 1 month
credit-assessment order transaction empty 1 month
credit scoring customer credit-card-info { credit-reference-agency } 1 month
credit resolution customer name empty 1 month
credit resolution customer credit-card-info empty 1 month
credit resolution order transaction empty 1 month
Table 7: CCC’s Privacy-Policies Table
purpose table attribute authorized-users
purchase customer name { Mississippi }
purchase customer address { Mississippi }
purchase customer email { Mississippi }
purchase customer fax-number { Mississippi }
purchase customer credit-card-info { Mississippi }
purchase order transaction { Mississippi }
purchase order book-info { Mississippi }
purchase order status { Mississippi }
delivery customer name { Mississippi }
delivery customer address { Mississippi }
direct delivery customer name { Mississippi, WWEx }
direct delivery customer address { Mississippi, WWEx }
delivery by post customer name { Mississippi, Post Office }
delivery by post customer address { Mississippi, Post Office }
credit-assessment customer name { Mississippi, CCC }
credit-assessment customer credit-card-info { Mississippi, CCC }
credit-assessment order transaction { Mississippi, CCC }
notification customer name { Mississippi }
notification customer email { Mississippi }
notification customer fax-number { Mississippi }
notification order book-info { Mississippi }
notification order status { Mississippi }
notification by email customer name { Mississippi }
notification by email customer email { Mississippi }
notification by email order book-info { Mississippi }
notification by email order status { Mississippi }
notification by fax customer name { Mississippi }
notification by fax customer fax-number { Mississippi }
notification by fax order book-info { Mississippi }
notification by fax order status { Mississippi }
Table 8: Mississippi’s Privacy-Authorization Table
purpose table attribute authorized-users
credit-assessment customer name { CCC }
credit-assessment customer credit-card-info { CCC }
credit-assessment order transaction { CCC }
credit scoring customer credit-card-info { CCC, CRC }
credit resolution customer name { CCC }
credit resolution customer credit-card-info { CCC }
credit resolution order transaction { CCC }
Table 9: CCC’s Privacy-Authorization Table
purpose table attribute authorized-users
purchase customer name { Mississippi }
purchase customer address { Mississippi }
purchase customer fax-number { Mississippi }
purchase customer credit-card-info { Mississippi }
purchase order transaction { Mississippi }
purchase order book-info { Mississippi }
purchase order status { Mississippi }
delivery customer name { Mississippi }
delivery customer address { Mississippi }
direct delivery customer name { WWEx }
direct delivery customer address { WWEx }
door-to-door delivery customer name { LDC1 }
door-to-door delivery customer address { LDC1 }
credit-assessment customer name { CCC }
credit-assessment customer credit-card-info { CCC }
credit-assessment order transaction { CCC }
credit scoring customer credit-card-info { CRC }
credit resolution customer name { CCC }
credit resolution customer credit-card-info { CCC }
credit resolution order transaction { CCC }
notification customer name { Mississippi }
notification customer fax-number { Mississippi }
notification order book-info { Mississippi }
notification order status { Mississippi }
notification by fax customer name { Mississippi }
notification by fax customer fax-number { Mississippi }
notification by fax order book-info { Mississippi }
notification by fax order status { Mississippi }
Table 10: Default Privacy-Authorizations Table
purpose table attribute authorized-users
purchase customer name { Mississippi }
purchase customer address { Mississippi }
purchase customer email { Mississippi }
purchase customer credit-card-info { Mississippi }
purchase order transaction { Mississippi }
purchase order book-info { Mississippi }
purchase order status { Mississippi }
delivery customer name { Mississippi }
delivery customer address { Mississippi }
delivery by post customer name { Post Office }
delivery by post customer address { Post Office }
credit-assessment customer name { CCC }
credit-assessment customer credit-card-info { CCC }
credit-assessment order transaction { CCC }
credit scoring customer credit-card-info { CRC }
credit resolution customer name { CCC }
credit resolution customer credit-card-info { CCC }
credit resolution order transaction { CCC }
notification customer name { Mississippi }
notification customer email { Mississippi }
notification order book-info { Mississippi }
notification order status { Mississippi }
notification by email customer name { Mississippi }
notification by email customer email { Mississippi }
notification by email order book-info { Mississippi }
notification by email order status { Mississippi }
Table 11: Alice’s Privacy-Authorizations Table
